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31. Introduction
Standard models of economic behavior are premised on the assumption that individual wants are
determined by forces exogenous to the economic system. Nevertheless, the dependence of preferences
on cultural norms and social institutions has long been recognized by economists. In The Wealth of
Nations, Adam Smith (1776) pointed out that the English of his day “would be ashamed to appear in
public” without wearing shoes and linen shirts, a standard of dress that Smith viewed as specific to the
place and time. Since Smith’s era, questions concerning the social contingency of wants have
appeared now and then in the literature. A common theme is that the satisfaction an individual derives
from goods and services depends upon aggregate consumption patterns in society as a whole. Veblen
(1899), for example, maintained that household are motivated in part by attempts to establish
enhanced social rank through conspicuous consumption. Duesenberry (1949) claimed that relative
income effects are a basic foundation of savings decisions. And Frank (1985) explored the biological
and psychological basis of preferences, arguing that social status plays an irreducible role in economic
behavior.
The assumption that perceived wants are independent of social context is a useful
simplifying device in the analysis of many economic problems. The representation of actual persons
through appeals to the stylized model of homo economicus, however, presents important challenges in
the analysis of social choice and welfare. In the context of environmental policy, standard theory
suggests that emissions taxes and related market-based incentives are sufficient to achieve optimal
levels of pollution abatement. Conservationists, in contrast, claim that resource depletion and
environmental degradation are tied to pervasive patterns of overconsumption requiring directed policy
solutions (Durning, 1992). In a synthesis of these views, Howarth (1996) examines a static externality
model in which utility depends in part on economic status, defined by the relative magnitudes of
individuals’ own consumption and average consumption in society. In this setting, the achievement of
a Pareto efficient resource allocation requires taxes on both consumption and pollution to address the
externalities generated by status-seeking and environmental degradation. In contrast with standard
theory, the optimal pollution tax generally exceeds the marginal benefit of pollution abatement,
calculated as the sum of individuals’ marginal willingness to pay for a cleaner environment.
In a related study, Ng and Wang (1993) explore the links between economic growth and
environmental quality in a model where the welfare of a representative individual depends on absolute
consumption, relative consumption, the fulfillment of aspirations, and the state of the environment.
The fulfillment of aspirations is measured by the ratio of personal consumption to a dynamic reference
4level that depends on the individual’s past consumption history. The authors note that individuals’
efforts to enhance their social standing through increased relative consumption are socially deleterious
since scarce resources are dissipated in a positional arms race (Frank and Cook, 1995) that is
ultimately unwinnable. Based on the assumption that individuals are myopic in the sense that they
ignore the impacts of their present consumption and their own future aspirations, the authors conclude
that the pursuit of aspirations also diminishes long-run personal well-being. Together, these factors
suggest that standard models of economic growth overstate the welfare gains achieved through rising
incomes. Since increased production and consumption are also tied to increased environmental
degradation, Ng and Wang argue that unconstrained growth may actually erode social welfare.
The present paper extends the analysis of these issues in three important respects. We
begin by setting the problem of preference determination and behavioral motivation into a context that
is explicitly linked to Sen’s (1985) distinction between commodities and functionings, in which the
mapping from goods and services to human welfare is contingent on social norms that are beyond the
control of individual decisions. In Sen’s framework, goods and services are valued only indirectly for
the contributions they make to functionings such as the satisfaction of basic needs and a positive self-
image. As we shall see, this reconceptualization of preferences suggests that ordinary consumption
may generate externalities that are connected to the evolution of perceived wants through time.
Next, we examine the relevance of research findings from social psychology and related
fields for the problem under investigation. Although economists have emphasized the role of
conspicuous consumption in signaling one’s relative status to other members of society, the
psychological literature suggests a richer interpretation in which the quest for identity and self-esteem
are more central considerations. In this perspective, the meanings goods and services (and hence their
instrumental value) is tied to shared conventions that are endogenously defined and reinforced through
consumption behavior and social engagement (Dittmar, 1992). Empirical research suggests that
prevailing consumption patterns and class identifications establish the vantage point through which
individuals evaluate their personal well-being. As such, the consumption bundle necessary to achieve
the “good life” is a moving target that depends on one’s social environment.
Finally, we explore the welfare implications of contingent wants in an extended version
of Nordhaus’ (1994) Dynamic Integrated model of Climate and the Economy (DICE), which examines
the tradeoffs between economic growth and the global environment in a numerical simulation
framework. While the base version of this model supports high rates of consumption growth and
greenhouse gas emissions, our analysis shows that these results depend critically on the assumption
that perceived wants are invariant over time and independent of prevailing economic conditions. Since
5the substantive findings of behavioral research provide strong reasons to doubt this assumption, our
analysis points to the need for further research on the empirical dimensions of preferences and welfare.
2. Commodities and functionings
In a seminal paper, Stigler and Becker (1977) argue that phenomena like addiction, customs,
advertising, and fashion can be analyzed using models characterized by stable tastes. The authors’
argument is based on the notion of a household production function, in which market commodities are
transformed into nonmarket goods that enter directly into individuals’ utility functions. In this setting
addictions, customs, advertising, and fashion modify the production function while leaving the utility
function itself unchanged.
In an extension of this framework, Amartya Sen (1985) introduces the concept of
functionings, which represent the effective services generated by material goods as mediated by social
and psychological factors. According to Sen (p. 15),
“It may be illuminating up to a point to see functionings as ‘commodities,’ produced
by the household, but this analogy can also be misleading since functionings are
features of the state of existence of a person, and not detached objects that the person
or the household happens to ‘produce’ and ‘own.’ Living long, or being free from
malaria, or not being ‘ashamed to appear in public,’ can be seen as commodities in
only a very limited sense, and a formal structure based on that sense need not be
particularly helpful.”
In Sen’s model, a single commodity might be used to provide entirely different functionings. A loaf of
bread, for example, may be used either to satisfy one’s appetite or to gather a group of friends to a
party. Similarly, different commodities might be used to provide similar functionings, just as different
types of food can assuage one’s hunger. But if a person ate fish at her last dinner, she might prefer
pasta the next night to provide the functioning of variety. Preferences are defined over functionings,
but as commodities are required to provide functionings, it is possible to derive preferences over
commodities from preferences over functionings.
Sen describes the formal aspects of his approach using the following nomenclature. Let xi
be a vector of commodities possessed by individual i, and let c(xi) be a function that converts this
commodity vector into a vector of characteristics. This distinction is emphasized by Lancaster (1971,
p. 6), who argues that the characteristics associated with goods and services are objectively
determinate:
“A steak is seen ... as something to eat, with many properties that could be agreed on by
everyone, and not as something with which to make clothing... Those who do not like
beef dislike some of its properties.”
6Since any commodity possesses a great number of physical properties, only some of which are
relevant to economic decisions, Lancaster defines characteristics in terms of properties that affect the
perceived value of goods.
According to Sen, the mapping from characteristics to functionings is given by:
bi = fi[c(xi)]
where bi is a vector of qualities that defines the state of being of person i and where f(·) is a so-called
“utilization function.” Sen is not explicit regarding the use of this framework in behavioral modeling,
nor even on the links between functionings and aggregate measures of individual welfare. He
describes both a happiness function h(bi) and a value of well-being function v(bi), noting that “whether
or not happiness is a plausible criterion of the goodness of life, valuing a life and measuring the
happiness generated in that life are two different exercises” (p. 12, emphasis in original). He does not
propose the maximization of either happiness or well-being as a behavioral hypothesis; indeed, his
writings repeatedly stress that such an approach would constitute be a decidedly narrow description of
human activity.
For our purposes, the key aspect of the model is that the functionings that a person
derives from a particular bundle of goods may depend on social institutions and prevailing economic
conditions. In Adam Smith’s example of clothing conventions in 18th century England, the relevant
functioning is to appear in public without shame. The type of clothing required to achieve this end
depends on cultural norms that in turn reflect the complex interplay of technological, economic, and
social conditions.
Human beings are social animals, and many of the functionings we aim to achieve are
characteristically social in nature. We need to belong to families and communities, have friends, earn
the respect of associates, and otherwise participate in social life. The analysis presented here builds on
the premise that economic factors such as consumption, possessions, occupational status, and so forth
are essential to the attainment of these functionings. In particular, one’s social prospects depends
importantly upon one’s economic standing relative to one’s peers.
To capture these effects we will focus on a simplification of Sen’s approach in which the
functionings obtained from the commodity vector xi are given by:
bi = fi(xi,si).
In this formulation, si is defined as a vector of socially determined variables that are relevant to person
i’s well-being but beyond her individual control, and hence taken as exogenous in private decision-
making. To illustrate this approach, consider the functioning “to appear in public without shame.” Let
7si  denote the quality of clothes deemed customary and appropriate given the cultural norms of person
i’s society. If xi is the quality of i’s wardrobe, we may define a functioning:
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In this setting, person i is able to appear in public without shame if (and only if) her clothing meets
prevailing expectations (bi = 1). Under this model, Adam Smith’s claim would be that si was higher in
18th century England than in earlier, and less wealthy, societies.
3. Varieties of social functionings
Adam Smith’s example of fashion conventions is useful in illustrating the links between commodities
and functionings in a context of contingent wants. To construct realistic models that incorporate these
concepts, however, requires explicit attention to the insights generated by social psychology and
related disciplines. The following sections provide a brief overview of the most relevant aspects of the
literature on the social determination of wants. Scitovsky (1976) and Frank (1985) present more
detailed treatments that emphasize the psychology of individual decision-making.
3.1. Material possessions as constitutive of the self
According to Mead (1913, 1934), human beings’ conception of the self depends on their ability to
view themselves from the perspective of others. This conceptual framework, which is commonly
known as symbolic interactionism, is aptly summarized by the Mead’s aphorism that “we must be
others if we are to be ourselves” (1934, p. 276). As Farr (1997) notes, Mead’s framework draws on the
concept of the “impartial spectator” that Adam Smith (1759) introduced to moral philosophy and
political economy. With this in mind, it is interesting to explore its implications for contemporary
economics.
Dittmar (1992, p. 75) embraces symbolic interactionism in her approach to the social
psychology of material possessions:
“The core of symbolic interactionism is the notion that developing a sense of identity
stems from the human ability for self-reflexivity... Self-awareness means that the self
becomes the object of reflection.”
Noting that “we do not experience our environment as a chaotic and overwhelming mass of
impressions, but as an ordered and comprehensible world” (pp. 67-68), she points out that the
concepts and meanings used to impose order on experience are strongly shaped by cultural traditions
and social conventions:
8“Material goods play a particular role here, in the sense that gender, class, and status are
clearly marked by certain kinds of possessions and dress. During socialization, we learn
to understand the map of our social environment in terms of which material possessions
signify which social categories” (p. 70).
Thus the meanings of commodities are not objective facts but rather social constructions, and the
functionings provided by goods and services are contingent on prevailing institutions.
Mead’s work stresses the supreme role of symbols and their socially shared meanings for
the development of a sense of identity. Although the concept of symbols covers language and myths in
addition to inanimate objects, the application of this framework to material commodities is especially
relevant for our purposes. According to Dittmar (p. 79),
“Material objects can symbolically communicate the personal qualities of individuals; that
they are, for instance, artistic, extroverted, conventional, adventurous or open-minded.”
The meanings of goods and services must be socially shared if they are to function as symbols. The set
of shared meanings, however, is not static, but is rather continuously evolving through the process of
social engagement. In this paper we focus particularly on how economic growth influences the
dynamics of meaning and hence the functionings provided by production and consumption.
3.2. Consumer goods as bridges to hopes and ideals
McCracken’s (1990) views on the displaced meaning of consumer goods provide an interesting
connection to symbolic interactionism. According to McCracken (p. 104),
“Consumer goods are bridges to … hopes and ideals. We use them to recover this
displaced cultural meaning, to cultivate what is otherwise beyond our grasp. In this
capacity, consumer goods are also a way of perpetually renewing our consumer
expectations. The dark side of this aspect of consumption is that it helps to enlarge our
consumer appetites so that we can never reach a ‘sufficiency’ of goods and declare ‘I
have enough.’”
This claim is grounded on the assumption that hopes and ideals would lose their functions if they were
readily attainable in our daily lives, as their perceived qualities would be reduced to the mundane
through overfamiliarity. On the other hand, hopes and ideals would serve no purpose if they were so
far beyond our reach that they lost their connections to experience. Hence we need bridges, and
consumer goods are perfect bridges. They are concrete objects here and now, but at the same time
their attainment is limited by prices and incomes. In this setting, luxury goods such as summer houses,
high-performance automobiles, and original works of art may emerge as socially defined symbols of
“the good life.”
A range of evidence suggests that the sudden acquisition of wealth may cause individuals
to reevaluate, and subsequently reject, their prior beliefs concerning the idealized value of status
9goods. McCracken (p. 113), for example, recounts the following anecdote from the Toronto Sunday
Star (Rickwood, 1984):
“A Canadian woman recently won $900,000 in a provincial lottery and then succeeded in
spending nearly half this amount in a three-week period. A reporter talked to her toward
the end of this riot of consumer activity and she confined in him: ‘A lot of fun is taken
out of life when you just go out and buy whatever you want. It is not as wonderful as you
think it will be before you win. I don’t think you can ever get back to the way it was
before.’”
This example corresponds to Kahneman’s (1994) finding of important disparities between “decision
utility” and “experienced utility” in economic choices. According to Kahneman, laboratory
experiments establish that the gratification anticipated from a future activity often bears little relation
to the gratification achieved when the activity actually takes place. Thus the drive to achieve economic
gain may be driven false beliefs about the true benefits of material goods that are conditioned by social
conventions.
3.3. Positional goods
A particular type of social functioning concerns the benefits that individuals derive from the use and
control of so-called positional goods. This concept, which was introduced by Hirsch (1976), is
connected to goods and services that are defined in relation to individuals’ comparative social
standing. The functionings pertaining to membership in the top decile of the income distribution, for
example, do not increase in availability as average incomes rise. In a similar fashion, only five
hundred persons can serve as chief executive officers in Fortune 500 firms, only the top-ranked
professors will be hired by the very best universities, and only the most talented players will find
employment in professional athletics.
Properly understood, positional goods are not functionings per se but rather means to
achieve functionings. Being hired by a top university may reinforce one’s conception of being
intellectually gifted, as well as contributing to the respect one receives from one’s colleagues and
friends. It is not axiomatic, of course, that functionings of this type exist in fixed relative abundance. A
person might, for example, define a new area in which she particularly excelled, while tactful
individuals might strive to ensure that all of their friends and colleagues felt honored and respected,
irrespective of their possession of positional goods. Nonetheless, the importance of relative standing in
anchoring self-worth and social esteem seems difficult to contest. Since the supply of these
functionings is in no sense affected by economic growth, it is interesting to suppose that the mapping
from positional goods to functionings is fixed.
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Hirsch stressed the importance of positional goods in his seminal book The Social Limits
to Growth. The main argument of this work is that the marginal utility of conventional commodities
falls as the economy grows in scale and people’s material needs become satisfied. As the direct
benefits of increased prosperity diminish in importance, people’s attention becomes focused on the
competition for positional goods, the supply of which is not augmented by economic growth. Thus
growth exacerbates rather than relieves distributional conflicts. As the economic pie grows larger,
people become more and more concerned with the distribution of relative shares.
As Brekke et al. (1998) show, the share of total expenditures allocated to the acquisition
of positional goods will increase with incomes only if the elasticity of substitution between positional
and normal goods is less than unity. With this in mind, Hirsch’s argument constitutes a conditional
hypothesis rather than a general theoretical result. This issue aside, the importance of positional goods
and related concepts of economic status is supported by both intuition and empirical generalizations.
Easterlin (1974, 1996), for example, examines the statistical links between income and subjective
well-being as measured through social surveys. His analysis finds that:
(1) In a given society at a given point in time, cross-sectional data reveal a positive correlation
between personal income and self-reported happiness.
(2) Time-series data from the 1950s to the present reveal no tendency for average life satisfaction to
rise with average incomes in the United States, Europe, and Japan.
Based on these observations, Easterlin conjectures that in affluent societies the perceived benefits of
consumption are defined mainly in comparative terms, so that one’s share of the pie becomes more
important than the size of one’s serving. An elaboration and evaluation of this argument is presented
by Oswald (1997).
3.4. Income and infrastructure
The frameworks discussed above focus on subjective mechanisms through which individual
preferences are influenced by aggregate patterns of economic activity. It is important to note, however,
that both subjective and objective factors play roles in defining the mapping from commodities to
social functionings. Sen (1983), for example, cites a case in which low-income students were
disadvantaged because their families did not own the television sets necessary to view curricularly
prescribed programs. Based on the assumption that most households own televisions, the school
system imposed requirements that, in effect, diminished the functionings attainable by students from
poor families.
In a similar fashion, reliance on private automobiles is central to the transportation
systems of modern cities such as Los Angeles. While the supporting infrastructure of subdivisions and
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expressways promotes mobility and hence personal freedom, it implies that central functionings such
as commuting to work, grocery shopping, and visiting friends are unattainable by people who lack
ready access to cars. Average incomes and infrastructure development are of course closely
interconnected. Since most people in western societies can afford automobiles, businesses cater to car
owners’ demand for highway access and convenient parking. These features, however, reduce access
for those lacking the income necessary to support car ownership. In this sense, low relative income
can substantively impair people’s ability to attain functionings that are not in themselves positional in
nature.
4. Modeling contingent preferences
We have developed the argument that cultural norms and shared systems of meaning play crucial roles
in defining the links between goods and services and human functionings. In this view, the benefits
derived from material commodities are strongly shaped by social conventions that are determined
endogenously within the economic system. On the one hand, individuals’ need for belonging and
identity is closely connected to the symbolic interpretations attached to material artifacts. On the other
hand, a person’s sense of self-worth and ability to attain valued functionings is in part a matter of
relative economic status. With this in mind, we turn our attention to the task of embedding these
concepts in a formal of economic growth and environmental quality.
As we noted above, we find Sen’s (1985) approach to commodities and functionings to
be particularly well-suited to the task at hand. Suppose, for example, that a standard consumption
good (c) provided two types of functionings, direct enjoyment and a positive self-image, the latter of
which was defined in terms of access to positional goods. For the purposes of modeling, it is useful to
specify the latter functioning as proportional to consumption:
b c s= /
where 1/s is the factor of proportionality between consumption and positional goods, or the effective
price of positional goods. Since positional goods exist in fixed in supply, we may normalize the social
standing of an average person to b = 1. Defining c as the average consumption level in society, it
follows that s c=  so that:
b c c= / .
In this setting, a direct demand for positional goods entails an implicit concern for relative
consumption. While this model by no means captures the variety of social functionings described in
the literature, it provides a relevant example that illustrates the essential structure of the problem.
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Under these assumptions, it is natural to represent individual preferences using the utility
function:
u c s u c c c( , ) ( , / )= .
Although Sen argues that utility maximization is an overly restrictive approach to behavioral
modeling, our aim is to introduce the concept of functionings into an otherwise standard description of
preferences and choice. In particular, we amend Nordhaus’ (1994) well-known Dynamic Integrated
model of Climate and the Economy (DICE) to incorporate the functionings associated with relative
consumption. The details are described in the following paragraphs.
4.1. The DICE model and relative consumption
The DICE model offers a parsimonious representation of the links between economic growth,
greenhouse gas emissions, and global climate change. In the standard version of this model, resource
allocation decisions are chosen to maximize the objective function:
N ct t
t
t
ln( ) / ( )1
0
+
=
∞∑ ρ
where Nt is total population at time t, ct is the consumption of a typical individual, and ρ  is the pure
rate of time preference. Nordhaus uses this approach to simulate the aggregation of individual and
collective choices in the world economy.
Production possibilities may be summarized using the reduced-form equation:
C K f K L E T t Kt t t t t t t+ = + −+1 1( , , , , ) ( )δ
where Ct = Ntct is aggregate consumption, Kt  is the capital stock, Lt is the supply of labor, Et is the
emission of greenhouse gases, Tt is the increase in mean global temperature relative to the pre-
industrial norm, and δ  is the rate of capital depreciation. Time enters the production function to allow
for exogenous technological change. The supply of labor is given by:
L Nt t t= λ
where λt  represents the proportion of people’s time devoted to labor activities. In Nordhaus’
specification, λ t  is taken as fixed so that labor services are strictly proportional to population. Finally,
temperature change is determined by past greenhouse gas emissions so that:
T T E Et t= −( ,..., )0 1 .
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The parameterization of this model is fully described by Nordhaus (1994) and need only
be sketched here. In DICE, population grows from 5.6 billion persons in 1995 to 10.5 billion in the
long-run future. The bulk of this increase is concentrated in the next one hundred years. The pure rate
of time preference ( ρ ) is set equal to 3 percent per year, while the rate of capital depreciation (δ ) is
10 percent per annum. The production function exhibits the familiar Cobb-Douglas form defined over
inputs of capital and labor, adjusted to reflect the costs and benefits of greenhouse gas emissions.
Technological change augments total factor productivity at an initial rate of 1.0 percent per year, but
slows gradually over time to reflect observed long-term trends. These assumptions ensure that the
model replicates observed rates of interest, investment, and economic growth in baseline simulations.
The labor supply parameter λ t  is defined only implicitly in DICE, though the value of
this parameter is important in the elaboration of the model that is described below. According to the
United Nations Development Programme (1993), a typical worker labors some 38 hours per week in
nations with detailed labor statistics. On the assumption that individuals are active for 16 hours each
day, or 112 hours each week, it follows that the proportion of time spent working isλ t = 0 34. .
DICE assumes that a doubling of atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations relative to
the pre-industrial norm would lead to a 2.9C temperature increase and a 1.2 percent loss of gross
world product. Climate change damages increase with the square of the temperature change caused by
human activities. The model is premised on the assumption that greenhouse gas emissions would rise
from 9.3 to 24 billion tonnes of carbon equivalent (tce) over the next century in the absence of
emissions control measures. A 50 percent emissions reduction leads to a 0.9 percent loss of gross
world output, while control costs rise to 6.9 percent with the complete control of emissions. Once in
the atmosphere, greenhouse gas molecules have a residence time of 120 years, with a doubling of
concentrations occurring by the mid-twenty-first century in the absence of abatement policies.
The main findings of the DICE model are well-known in the literature. As illustrated by
the base runs presented in Table 1, the optimal path for this economy supports substantial growth in
aggregate consumption, the capital stock, and greenhouse gas emissions. Under the stipulated
assumptions, it is better to bear the costs of climate change than to impose aggressive greenhouse gas
emissions abatement policies. Hence emissions are reduced by only 9-14 percent in comparison with
unconstrained levels, while mean global temperature increases by 4.6C through the year 2195.
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Table 1. DICE model runs, generalized version with  = 0 versus base run. Base run in
parenthesis
1995 2035 2075 2115 2155 2195
N 109 persons 5.6
(5.5)
7.9
(7.9)
9.2
(9.2)
9.9
(9.9)
10.3
(10.3)
10.4
(10.4)
C 1012 1989 USD/yr 19
(19)
45
(45)
72
(73)
94
(96)
110
(112)
120
(123)
K 1012 1989 USD/yr 48
(48)
120
(120)
199
(202)
267
(273)
318
(325)
352
(361)
 % 34
(34)
34
(34)
33
(34)
33
(34)
33
(34)
33
(34)
E 109 tce/yr 8.5
(8.5)
14
(14)
19
(19)
22
(22)
24
(24)
25
(25)
T C 0.8
(0.8)
1.6
(1.6)
2.5
(2.5)
3.4
(3.4)
4.1
(4.1)
4.6
(4.6)
The discussion thus far is limited to a presentation of the core structure and results of
DICE under Nordhaus’ initial specification. We turn now to the description of a more general version
of this model that incorporates the functionings associated with relative consumption and a labor-
leisure tradeoff. In the specification of preferences, suppose that policies and institutions are chosen to
maximize the revised objective function:
N ut t
t
t
/ ( )1
0
+
=
∞∑ ρ
where:
u c bt t t t= − + + −( ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( )1 1α α β λ .
In this setting, ut  is the utility of a typical individual, whileb c ct t t= /  is an index of her relative
consumption in comparison with the social average. Under these assumptions, the parameterα defines
the weight individuals attach to their perceived economic standing. The third term of the utility
function reflects the disutility of labor or, equivalently, the utility gained from leisure. Here 1− λ t
represents the proportion of time that a typical person devotes to non-work activities, which is
explicitly chosen to balance the perceived costs and benefits of labor.
In the absence of relative consumption effects (i.e., with α = 0 ), the standard and
extended versions of DICE yield closely similar results when the leisure preference parameter is set
equal to β = 18. , the value that is employed in the simulations reported here (Table 1). This
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correspondence suggests that the assumption of a fixed relationship between labor supply and
population is a useful descriptive device under the stipulated conditions.
It is readily observed, however, that the decisions made by decentralized individuals in
competitive markets would be independent of the particular value assumed by α . To see this, note
that the utility function may be written in the form:
u c ct t t t= − + −ln( ) ln( ) ln( ).α β λ1
Since a rational individual would take the average consumption level ct as an exogenous
(socially determined) parameter, she would behave as if her preferences were defined by the
simplified function ln( ) ln( )ct t+ −β λ1  in which relative consumption plays no explicit role. If public
policies sought to equate the marginal costs and benefits of greenhouse gas emissions but did not
address the externalities associated with relative consumption, the resulting resource allocation would
maximize this naive specification of social preferences, replicating the results summarized in Table 1.1
Figures 1-5 in the appendix show that optimal paths for this economy depart from the
base results for the DICE model when individual preferences depend significantly on relative
consumption. (For purposes of comparison, the figures also depict a laissez faire scenario in which
resources are allocated by competitive markets in the absence of taxation.) From a social perspective
c ct t= so that the utility of a typical person is ( ) ln( ) ln( )1 1− + −α β λct t . As  increases from zero to
0.75, the proportion of time devoted to labor falls from 34 to 11 percent, while consumption levels are
reduced by up to 55 percent in the short run and 66 percent in the year 2195. The intuition behind
these results is that, under these conditions, relative consumption contributes to individual but not
social welfare. The perceived social benefits of consumption are therefore diminished in
correspondence to the weight individuals attach to relative consumption.
The links between relative consumption and environmental quality are also illustrated by
these simulations. Since greenhouse gas emissions are driven by aggregate economic activity, and
since optimal social choices reign in labor and consumption to account for the external costs
associated with relative consumption effects, optimal levels of greenhouse gas emissions fall as the
value of  increases. For  = 0, emissions rise from 8.5 to 25 billion tonnes of carbon equivalent per
year between 1995 and 2195, while mean global temperature increases by 4.6C relative to the pre-
                                                    
1
 Note that this interpretation ignores existing taxes on income and consumption as well as the social benefits generated by
public expenditures. It might be argued that current policies internalize the costs of consumption externalities so that the
baseline path of the economy correponds to a social optimum for some α > 0 .  As our main objective is to illustrate the
qualitative importance of social norms in economic choices, we simplify by setting α = 0 in the base case, thereby
conforming to the assumptions of Nordhaus’ initial specification.
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industrial norm. In the extreme case where  = 0.75, in contrast, emissions are reduced to 3.7 billion
tonnes in 1995 and 8.9 billion tonnes in 2195, limiting the increase in mean global temperature to
2.8C over the period of analysis.
5. Conclusion
The standard models of economic theory are premised on the assumption that individual wants are
determined by forces exogenous to the economic system. This paper has explored the legitimacy of
this assumption and its importance in applied welfare economics. In particular, we have argued that
the theoretical and empirical findings of social psychology and related fields provide compelling
evidence that the subjective welfare that individuals derive from goods and services depends
fundamentally on preference parameters that are in turn shaped by prevailing cultural values and
economic conditions. In this context, the meanings of commodities are established and reinforced by
social conventions, and consumption patterns are used by individuals to establish their identities and to
signal social status to other members of society.
As we have seen, the endogenous nature of wants fits well with Sen’s (1985) distinction
between commodities and functionings in behavioral motivation. In this setting, commodities are
valued because they are instrumentally useful in supporting both basic human needs and social
functionings such as a sense of self-worth or, to draw once more on Adam Smith’s (1776) analogy, the
ability to appear in public without shame. We have argued that social norms play a crucial role in the
mapping between commodities and functionings, making the case that the desire for positional goods
and economic status, as well as the need to conform to the demands imposed by prevailing
infrastructure and technologies, imply that consumption behavior generates externalities that are
mediated by their impacts on the evolution of preferences.
Finally, we have shown that introducing the functionings associated with relative
consumption into Nordhaus’ (1994) model of climate change and the world economy leads to
fundamental changes in the model’s policy implications. In the absence of relative consumption
effects, Nordhaus concludes that relatively modest steps are warranted to abate greenhouse gas
emissions since emissions control would lead to costly reductions in short-run consumption. Our
analysis extends these results to show that substantial reductions in both consumption and emissions
would be socially desirable if relative consumption played an important role in individual preferences.
This finding, of course, depends on the particular specification of the model and is presented for
mainly illustrative purposes. It is sufficient to show, however, that invoking the preferences of homo
economicus can lead to important biases in the recommendations of applied welfare economics.
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We conclude, then, that there is a fundamental need for further research on the links
between psychology, economics, and related disciplines on the endogenous determination of perceived
wants and their importance in individual behavior and well-being. Psychological realism is as
important as methodological convenience in the analysis of social choice and welfare, and it is not
sufficient to embrace models that generate correct positive predictions regarding economic
phenomena. Although research of this type blurs the distinctions implicit in traditionally defined
academic disciplines, it is necessary both to restore to the broad perspective of classical political
economy and to provide credible guidance regarding contemporary policy choices.
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Appendix
Figure 1:  Consumption (trillion 1989 $)
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Figure 2:  Capital Stock (trillion 1989 $)
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Figure 3:  Labor Effort (%)
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Figure 4:  Greenhouse Gas Emissions (billion tce)
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Figure 5:  Temperature Change (degrees C)
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